Building on the concept of the 'surveillance-industrial complex,' I move from the 'complex' to the 'community,' situating a number of organizations within 'surveillance design communities' (SDCs). SDCs are networks of linked organizations which engage in researching, developing, producing, and circulating surveillance technologies. Empirically I draw from data on the organizations involved in border surveillance funded by the European Union's FP7-Security programme. Based on the novel conceptualization of SDCs, coupled with an analysis of new network data, the article demonstrates that important contributions to the design of surveillance are distributed among a small core of central organizations surrounded by communities of actors assembled in overlapping hierarchies. Hence, SDCs are interwoven, multi-scalar networks rather than a total 'complex' or sites for the overlap of the 'public' and 'private.'
Introduction
A number of scholars, journalists, and activists have argued that we may be witnessing the development of a 'security-industrial complex' in Europe which resembles the earlier 'military-industrial complex' of the Cold War (Hayes 2006; Guittet and Jeandesboz 2010) . The security-industrial complex refers to the relations between military, security, academia, and industry within a global market for the design and implementation of security technologies. The main actors are governments, suppliers of security technologies, research organizations, and security forces demanding use of new technologies. The idea of a security-industrial complex has been extended by the concept of the surveillance-industrial complex, a notion proposed by Hayes (2012: 167) to refer to "the relationship between the private sector and the state in developing and implementing surveillance systems for law enforcement and security purposes." Although the concepts of security-industrial and surveillance-industrial complex promise a critical and empirically grounded picture of the relations between public and private security actors, they have been criticized as oversimplifying a complex and diverse field which has a number of local manifestations, with a heterogeneity of actors involved in the funding, development, marketing, promotion, and use of technological systems of security and surveillance (Guittet and Jeandesboz 2010: 236) .
In order to address these criticisms, I choose to focus on the research and development of surveillance technologies in Europe by accounting for the formation of what I call 'surveillance design communities' (SDCs), moving from the total 'complex' to the tangled 'community' in order to unravel the overlapping network structures involved in surveillance technology design. Surveillance design communities can be conceived of as networks "in which the practical and political steps needed to transform an information technology into a system for surveillance and control are inevitably embodied" (Hayes 2012: 167) .
In this article I develop a network analytic conception of SDCs, allowing us to graph, visualize, and analyze them using standard network analytic techniques. I draw on empirical data collected from the European Union's FP7-Security programme, focusing on projects funded to research and develop border surveillance technologies. The article begins with a theoretical section introducing surveillance design communities and their formation, followed by a methods section detailing the network analytic methods employed. I then use a number of techniques from network analysis to visualize and analyze the central organizations and communities which arise from the data. The article concludes with a discussion and suggestions for future research.
The Formation of Surveillance Design Communities
The growth of SDCs is rooted in multiple mutually constitutive processes. Two main processes are discussed here in relational to borders and frontiers, as the current analysis focuses on border surveillance. Additional explanations for SDCs in other domains (urban surveillance, cybersurveillance, etc.) are not covered here.
First, the politics of constructing borders, or 'teichopolitics,' in parallel with the transformation of the boundaries between internal/external security and public/private institutions, have expanded the space for new models of 'border surveillance' to form in Europe (Bigo 2001 (Bigo , 2006 Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; Rosiere and Jones 2012) . 'Border surveillance,' as a manifestation of teichopolitics (deliberations over how to 'improve' territorial enclosures and boundaries) and the entangling of internal/external and public/private, becomes a socio-technical model for constructing new divisions of inside/outside, protecting national privileges, and gaining economic advantage for transnational elites (Rosiere and Jones 2012) .
The de-centering of the national scale has rearranged relations among the organizations involved in border-making politics at multiple scales, recalibrating how 'border surveillance' is thought and practiced, and re-calibrating demand from the state for the involvement of new organizations in migration management (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000) . The multi-scalar character of EU teichopolitics, the growing integration of internal/external security and public/private, has led to intensified surveillance of border spaces, through the erection of new high-tech boundaries around Europe such as the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), and new demands for surveillance technologies which provide the material infrastructure for the new boundaries (The European Parliament and The Council of the European Union 2013).
Second, the interpenetration and convergence of migration controls among multiple actors traces a corresponding movement between states and markets in the provision of border surveillance (Krahmann 2008) . The continual movement between state and market has been explicitly outlined in EU policy documents, a discourse which is emblematic of the new technosecurity paradigm and the technological fix to perceived security problems, which embraces the perceived superiority of market-mediated technological solutions over participatory democratic solutions (Hayes 2012) . For example, the outdated Stockholm Programme, the five-year policy plan for Justice and Home Affairs which laid down the logics for FP7 Security funding, implored the Commission to support and fund the development of new security technologies. This entails 'upgrading the tools for the job': "Security in the Union requires an integrated approach where security professionals [a term which covers both state and market actors] share a common culture, pool information as effectively as possible and have the right technological infrastructure to support them" (The European Council 2010: 18) . In other words, the movement between state and market presents a bias whereby states overvalue surveillance technology, feeding resources into a process of 'PreCommercial Procurement' (Salieri 2014) , a process whereby security technologies are designed and developed before reaching the market. Only after sustained state support for their development do the technologies reach a commercializable and marketizable state. Multiple phases of development (including 'capabilities,' 'integration,' and 'demonstration' projects) ensure that (a) market competition is fostered by the state and competitive pressure is state-led, and (b) risk is shared between the state and market during the design and production of surveillance technologies in Europe.
Support for the new structures of market-state integration has come partly through FP7 programmes, and in this sense surveillance design communities deliberately arise through FP7-Security funding. Bigo et al. (2014: 8) confirm that overall FP7 security funding "has been overwhelmingly devoted to security and defence programmes of large transnational corporations, ministries of Interior and Defence and technical research institutions, with little funding for data protection, privacy and the respect of fundamental freedoms in security applications." The variegation of teichopolitical models of border surveillance across multiple institutions and scales has led to a staggering growth of organizations (such as lobbyists, thinktanks, consultancies, etc.) which promote surveillance, as well as to the involvement of scholarly and legal 'expertise' in the design of surveillance technologies (Hayes 2012) .
The actual structure of state-market forms, I will demonstrate, is embodied by surveillance design communities (SDCs) composed of heterogeneous actors operating at multiple hierarchical scales. This suggests that there is no single relation between state and market, but multiple relations linking actors together in tangled communities. By defining SDCs in a manner covalent with theories of network structure, we can hone in on particular components of the system and map the actors, their relations, and closely trace the outline of community structure.
Community, in the sense used in this article, is distinct from conceptions of 'security communities,' 'epistemic communities,' 'international community,' or even 'system' or 'assemblage.' 'Community,' in the network theoretic sense employed here, is an identifiable group of organizations who are linked through an identifiable pattern of relations arranged in a scalable social structure. 'Design' can be conceived as a social process where technological innovation occurs, and certain actors within the network space are (dis)empowered by their relations and positions within the social structure. Design involves the production and adaption of surveillance technologies, within a community social structure which can be mapped using network analytic methods.
Building on network theory, teichopolitics, and movement between market and state, a number of interrelated questions arise from the preceding discussion:
(1) Which are the main organizations involved in the design of border surveillance technologies in Europe? Where are they located? Do they form discernible 'community' structures which we can graph, visualize, and analyze? (2) Do the relational structures of SDCs reflect the movement between state and market in the development of border surveillance technologies? What is the financial investment into SDCs?
In the following sections I provide answers to these questions by using theoretical elements from security studies, network analytic methods, and a collection of relevant primary and secondary sources.
Methods: Graphing, Visualizing, and Analyzing Surveillance Design Communities
Networks are complex structures which have common properties, including scale-free distributions, the formation of clusters and communities, and small-world properties (Strogatz 2001 (Emirbayer 1997; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994) . Relational thinking allows us to understand complex heterogeneous linkages within and across social scales, so that social patterns and configurations at one scale can be understood in relation to other scales in which they are embedded. For example, "[s]uch links become central to current security issues, such as the techno-scientific assemblage of the military-industrial complex" (Soreanu and Simionca 2013: 183) .
Furthermore, network analysis can be "applied in a non-positivist fashion" (Buch-Hansen 2013: 1), supporting work in critical security studies which analyzes the relations between actors and their changing positions. Rather than defining a set of hypotheses and testing them, social network analysis can be used as a 'design tool' to raise questions about security and surveillance (Weber and Lacy 2010) , a creative way of coupling available computer technologies to critiques of surveillance technologies and SDCs. Network analytic methods spring from technological innovation within the fields of network and data science, and the resourceful researcher can utilize these innovations and harness their power in the pursuit of critical rethinking of security and surveillance. Such an approach provides a suitable companion to researchers working across disciplines and provides opportunities for researchers aiming for 'messy truths' and 'political effects' through their methods (Aradau and Huysmans 2014) .
Relational accounts of surveillance communities which analyze the patterns of ties that form between actors at multiple scales, how these patterns evolve, and what impacts they have on the politics and practice of (in)security and surveillance, represent powerful tools for deriving new empirical, theoretical, and methodological insights. This article complements previous work by outlining a network analytic approach to the surveillance-industrial complex, allowing us to map the complex heterogeneous linkages between actors. However, due to data limitations and space concerns, an extended discussion of the formation and the effects of SDCs is not possible (see 'Formation' above and Discussion below), and the analysis focuses on network structure.
and 2-mode Network Analysis
Most network analysis focuses on links between one type of actor-people to people, firms to firms, or states to states-known as 1-mode networks because they consist of ties connecting like to like. In order to take into account multiple scales and structures, networks can be constructed where links form between distinct types which differ-people to firms, people to events, firms to owners, and so forth-known as 2-mode networks (alternatively 'affiliation' or 'bipartite' networks) (Borgatti and Halgin 2011) . In the 2-mode network graphed in this article, links form between organizations and FP7-Security projects. For example, if organization a participates in project z, then a link between the organization and the project is formed.
Analyzing 2-mode networks requires sensitivity to the bipartite structure of the graph, as measures used for 1-mode networks require some modification to be used on a 2-mode graph (Borgatti and Everett 1997; Vernet, Kilduff, and Salter 2014; Everett and Borgatti 2013; Latapy, Magnien, and Vecchio 2008) .
Typically, 2-mode graphs are projected into two separate 1-mode graphs with weighted links, which allows for the use of standard graph analytic techniques, although in projecting 2-mode graphs into 1-mode graphs information may be lost. However, combining insights from analyzing the 2-mode graph in correspondence with its two 1-mode projections allows us to recover the loss of information and present a rich and detailed analysis of the patterns of relations at multiple structural levels (Everett and Borgatti 2013) . In the current analysis, the 2-mode network is projected into two 1-mode networks: a project network and an organizational network, both weighted (non-normalized) based on the frequency of coparticipation in projects (Borgatti and Halgin 2011) . The analysis will focus on three networks-a 2-mode network of organizations and projects, a projected 1-mode network of only projects, and a projected 1-mode network of only organizations-in order to reveal the complex multi-scalar communities involved in researching and developing surveillance technologies in Europe.
Finally, the advantage of FP7 network data is that they are available publically online. Data on nodes and their connections was compiled using public sources freely available online via the EU Commission, FP7 project websites, and secondary academic sources. FP7 project websites detail all the partners of a particular project. Only project 'partners,' not 'end users' (primarily composed of governments), were included as nodes. Each project partner was selected as a node, and each partner of a project was connected to their respective project node. Where some nodes were partners of multiple projects, their connections spanned between them. Node attributes were collected from the organizations' websites and secondary academic sources. Degree centrality is simply a node's total number of connections to other nodes. The more connections a node has, the more 'central' the node, and the more central the node the more power, influence, or resources that node is expected to have. Graphs tend to have a few nodes with very high degrees and many nodes with low degrees, following a power-law or exponential distribution (Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman 2009 ). However, degree centrality is a weak measure because it does not bring the structure of the entire graph into the frame, but only the degree of a particular node. Closeness centrality measures how 'close' a node is to all the other nodes, based on network geodesics (shortest paths among the nodes). Closeness centrality measures the reciprocal of the distance between all the nodes in the graph. The closer a node is to every other node, the higher its closeness centrality. Betweenness centrality is also based on geodesics (shortest paths). Betweenness centrality measures the degree to which a node is advantageously placed to deliver information or resources 'between' other nodes. Nodes which have higher betweenness are better situated to allow information or resources to flow through them. Finally, eigenvector centrality builds on degree centrality, and measures the centrality of a node depending on the centralities of other nodes in its neighborhood. A node with high eigenvector centrality is more central if it is connected to other central nodes. It measures degree centrality, but weights the node by the degree centrality of the nodes connected to it, which are weighted by the nodes connected to them, and so on. The largest values are gained by nodes in high-density cliques (where every node is connected to every other node).
Centralities

Community Detection
Although there is no single network analytic definition, communities are groups of connected nodes and/or links, typically densely connected internally rather than externally, forming sub-graphs of the full network (Radicchi et al. 2004) . Communities can be thought of as 'modular' in that they are modules of the larger network. The community detection problem is common in network analysis, and a number of different algorithms and techniques have been devised to detect communities in large 1-mode and 2-mode networks (Clauset, Newman, and Moore 2004; Girvan and Newman 2002; Newman and Girvan 2004; Palla et al. 2005) . It is a question of how to split a network graph (which in this case represents a group of related and interacting organizations) into sub-graphs (communities). Sub-graphs should be modular, meaning that the nodes belonging to that sub-graph interact more with each other than with nodes outside the sub-graph, in the rest of the network. The problem arose in the study of social structure, social systems, and cohesion, and is related to the methodological issue of clustering in data mining. In applied research or research in critical security studies, community detection can assist in decomposing large networks into sub-networks, revealing important actors, their overlapping relations, and centralities.
With regard to SDCs, community detection methods are crucial. Looking only at the formal FP7 projects, we only gain sight of what is visible based on project ties. Community detection can reveal unseen relationships between projects and among organizations. Raw numbers of affiliation in multiple projects only reveal the frequency of co-participation but do not say much about the unseen communities that form in-between projects: only community detection methods allow us to hone in on the multiple, overlapping, and hierarchical character of surveillance design communities. In other words, an analysis of FP7 projects alone provides opportunities for understanding how surveillance is designed within projects, but detecting overlapping communities allows us to see how design flows between and among projects at multiple scales. In this way we are able to trace the 'logics' behind the relational structure of the network revealed by graphing SDCs.
In the analysis of SDCs here, the link communities algorithm is used (Ahn, Bagrow, and Lehmann 2010) . Link communities are an alternative community detection measure which detects communities based not on the position of actors within the network, but on the links between actors. Whereas hierarchical clustering and the fast-unfolding algorithms focus on actors as members of the community, the link communities algorithm focuses on links as members of a community (Ahn, Bagrow, and Lehmann 2010) . In the context of FP7 projects, analyzing linkages rather than nodes makes sense: we are interested in the relations between organizations and the content of these relations, and detecting the complex patterns of relations can reveal underlying community dynamics relevant for addressing the research questions. Resources, knowledge, and techniques about the design of surveillance are expected to flow through the links, and understanding the communities that form because of these linkages can reveal the complex ways in which SDCs transfer socio-technical models of border surveillance and market logics of research design through their organizational structures. Visualization and analysis of these communities is carried out on the 1-mode organizations graph using the link communities algorithm in R (Kalinka and Tomancak 2011; Ahn, Bagrow, and Lehmann 2010) . There are two visualizations presented: a dendrogram showing the number and distribution of communities, and a community membership plot showing the organizations which belong to multiple communities, which accompanies a table showing the most central organizations within the communities.
Data and Results
On 24 September 2013, the Protecting EuRopean Seas and borders through the intelligent USe of surveillance (PERSEUS) project held its first demonstration event in Madrid, Spain. The project was designed to support the implementation of the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR). The one-day event was hosted by the Spanish Guardia Civil, and aimed "to give attendees a privileged view to the operational validation of the new capabilities developed for maritime surveillance. The event … focuses on combatting irregular migration and illegal trafficking coming in through the Alboran sea" (Guardia Civil 2013 (Bigo et al. 2014: 6) . PERSEUS, however, is only the largest project funded by FP7 for developing border surveillance technologies: there are at least 17 more FP7-funded research projects assisting the implementation of EUROSUR (see the Appendix for the full list of projects included, and Figure 1 for the projected 1-mode network of projects). Each research and development project is led by a major transnational firm in Europe, many of which are subsidiaries or directly affiliated with larger global defense firms. The coordinator sits at the center of (un)equal power relations driving the logics of research: these organizations may attempt to impose particular conceptions of how to conceive of the design of surveillance technologies and what these technologies are supposed to do. In order to understand the power dynamics involved, we turn to measures of network centrality to chart who the most central actors are in the networks before turning to the communities which they form.
Centralities
In Table 1 , we see the normalized centralities of projects in the 2-mode network alongside the monetary value of the projects (eigenvector centralities have been removed for this table). Note that the most central projects according to their centrality scores are not necessarily the highest valued, or vice versa. OPERAMAR, for example, is valued at approximately 0.7 million euros, making it one of the least expensive projects, but is rated centrally 'close' to other projects based on its normalized closeness centrality. PERSEUS is valued highly in euros, and also maintains high positions on many of the normalized scores. These discrepancies reveal the ways in which certain projects contain multiple connections between project partners across projects, but may or may not be left out of competition over large amounts of resources. Some projects have little money but have close links with other projects to facilitate resource utilization, while others are highly funded and share links among a wide variety of organizations. The cooperation towards or competition over resources to invest in surveillance design communities partly stems from professionalized decision-making structures (such as the FP7 application process itself and associated 'tendering' processes) and prioritizing the formation of particular communities who have access to these resources over other communities who are denied or restricted access. The organizational logics of Pre-Commercial Procurement, for example, give certain organizations an advantage in bargaining power over who gets resources to form a design project and how these resources are distributed within the community, leading to differential community structures and positions of organizations within these communities. In Table 2 , we see the normalized centralities of the organizations in the 2-mode network (including eigenvector centralities). The Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the EU Commission is very central to the network across all scores (see https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/), underscoring the important role that the EU Commission plays in orchestrating the formation of SDCs through the substantial funding and support of FP7 projects. Proposing the agenda for technological innovation and design, appropriating a budget, arranging competitive applications, bidding, and tendering processes through application for funding, defining the criteria for membership in projects, deciding on the distribution of funding, and encouraging the participation of the private sector are each crucial components of the Commission's activities in spearheading the practice of designing surveillance technologies. Matters related to the design processestablishing standards, 'harmonizing' decision-making, promoting the transfer of knowledge and practice within the network, facilitating partnerships among diverse organizations (linking universities to the private sector for example), or acting as broker between national ministries-are handled by the JRC, partially explaining its strong central position across all scores.
Beyond the JRC, the most central actors of the network are private firms and applied research organizations either involved in (a) the research, development, design, and manufacture of experimental technologies in the field of surveillance, (b) information technologies (IT), or (c) aerospace and defense agencies. The most central organizations roughly correspond to two of the three "universes of EU border control" identified by Bigo (2014) : the military-strategic field (military/navy) and the global cybersurveillance social universe (database analysts). The internal security field (border guards/police) is involved as well, but such organizations do not occupy central positions in SDCs as graphed here, but nevertheless are crucial players as implementing organizations ('end-users').
In addition, some projects may have different ratios of organizations-more applied research, or more private firms, further underscoring the uneven character of these communities and the uneven penetration of logics of border surveillance, cooperation, innovation, and research design. Surveillance design communities are conceived here as co-productions among heterogeneous actors pursuing high-tech innovation of surveillance technologies. In turn, some organizations are more important than others for the maintenance and running of EUROSUR but do not occupy central positions in the design network. For example, the private firm GMV coordinates the SAGRES (Service Activations for GRowing Eurosur Success) project and obtained the contract for the enlargement of EUROSUR in October 2012, but does not hold a particularly central position in the network. In other words, the presence of uneven power hierarchies at the scale of the organization do not reveal the power hierarchies at alternative scales. Individual actors within the organizations may hold crucial positions for gaining new funding or positions, processes which are not revealed by the organizational analysis employed here. The design of surveillance technologies are coupled to implementation in ways that might not be captured at the organizational scale, but can be understood at the local, micro-political scale, opening opportunities for future ethnographic work or network methods which observe and/or graph the individual social networks of actors involved.
In Figure 2 we see a visualization of the network, colored by organizational type. The network is composed primarily by private firms, applied research organizations, and consultancies, of which the most central are outlined in Table 2 . The network is dominated by a small group of centralized organizations, involved predominantly in for-profit enterprise in the defense and IT sectors. The centrality of private firms in the network reflects the movement between state and market in the development of border surveillance technologies, with an imbalance towards the market and commercial firms in providing the services for the development and production of surveillance technologies. Capital investment (in the form of FP7 grants or as private investment) is spurred by state involvement and demand for particular policylinked products, such as maritime surveillance technologies for use in EUROSUR. Thus, multi-scalar structures like the EU deliberately inflate demand for surveillance technologies through Pre-Commercial Procurement processes, or through legislative decisions which effect markets and investor reactions: private investors likely react positively to EU decisions on migration management, as profits for new goods and services are expected to increase, as seen with the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Bechtel and Schneider 2010) . Finally, when we turn to Figure 3 we see the national positions of the headquarters of the organizations within the network. Most headquarters are located in Italy, France, and Spain, three nations with robust defense industries. Some information is lost, however, when we look only at the national headquarters, as some organizations in the network are trans-European (such as EADS, now Airbus Group), and other organizations are represented in multiple locations because they are branches of a large multinational firm. 'Rest,' ranked by percentage, includes Finland, Greece, Sweden, Ireland, Romania, Malta, Turkey, Switzerland, Israel, Luxembourg, Hungary, Czech Republic, USA, Austria, Slovenia, Denmark, Cyprus, Estonia (non-EU in italics 
Communities
In this section, the visualization and analysis of these communities is carried out on the 1-mode organizations graph using the link communities algorithm in R (Kalinka and Tomancak 2011; Ahn, Bagrow, and Lehmann 2010 Figure 4 represents SDCs in a dendrogram, which visualizes the number and overlapping character of communities, displaying a dense concentration of 35 overlapping communities of varying size (far more than the 18 formal FP7 projects). The link communities algorithm is able to detect complexity at multiple scales, represented by the multiple partitions of the dendrogram. The dendrogram is cut at the optimal partition in order to visualize the most relevant communities, based on link density within communities, although other meaningful communities can be revealed by cutting above or below the optimal partition (Ahn, Bagrow, and Lehmann 2010) . The 35 detected communities are unified, overlapping, multi-scalar organizational formations, revealing the complex power hierarchies within and between surveillance design communities, and highlighting the difficulties in untangling the positions, relations, and centralities of major organizations within SDCs. The link communities dendrogram visualizes the overlapping hierarchical structure which undergirds the inter-organizational diffusion of socio-technical models of border surveillance and models for the design and development of surveillance technologies in Europe. In order to grasp the multi-scalar complexity of surveillance design communities, it is useful to visualize the most central organizations in the communities (Table 3) as well as which organizations participate in the most overlapping communities ( Figure 5 ). In Table 3 we see the most central organizations among the communities and their corresponding projects. Keep in mind that the organizations participate not only in multiple FP7 projects, but according to the link community detection method, they also participate in multiple extra-project communities which span multiple scales and involve complex configurations of organizational sub-networks. In other words, organizations can be members of multiple SDCs at the same time.
Figure 5: Community Membership Plot. This matrix visualizes the organizations which belong to more than one community. Only the top 10 organizations are visualized. The right vertical axis labels the organizations, the left vertical axis the number of communities each organization belongs, the top horizontal axis shows the community number corresponding to the dendrogram, and the bottom horizontal axis shows the number of organizations in a community. CNIT= Consorzio Nazionale Interuniversitario per le Telecomunicazioni; TNO= Nederlandse Organisatie Voor Toegepast Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek (The Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research). Note that not every community is represented, only those with the most 'overlap.' Visualization was completed with the linkcomm package in
R (Kalinka and Tomancak 2011 (Kalinka and Tomancak 2011). Participation in multiple SDCs is further represented in Figure 5 , whereby the most active organizations are revealed. Again, predominantly private firms and applied research organizations involved in aerospace and maritime defense are represented, underscoring the complex power hierarchies which arise among SDCs. Finmeccanica, one of the largest defense producers in the world, is represented in multiple communities. Other large defense companies like Boeing (USA), BAE Systems (UK), EADS (transEuropean, now Airbus Group), participate in multiple surveillance design communities, but are not the most central.
It is striking to note that many of the most central organizations also participate in multiple communities, suggesting that primarily large multinational firms and applied research organizations knit together SDCs through their overlapping ties. The centrality of private firms has important implications for the formation of SDCs and the important design and policy resources which flow within and between them.
Hence, in extension of theories which outline a division and/or overlap between the 'public' and 'private,' or theories of the 'security-industrial complex,' SDCs are associated with tangled overlapping hierarchies, vertical and horizontal power networks, and tangled relations which form communities. There are multiple entry points into the community: through powerful central actors, or through peripheral actors, or through actors who are neither central nor peripheral, but inhabit multiple communities at once. The division of design tasks is linked not only to powerful central actors, but to diffuse communities. The SDCs give space to resource exchange, rationalities of design, and process work-flows that lead to technological innovation. Hence, SDCs are interwoven overlapping networks rather than simply a total 'complex' or sites for the overlap of the 'public' and 'private.'
Discussion
Due to the limited empirical basis of the article (all data come from network ties) it is difficult to draw further conclusions regarding SDCs beyond the network data. A number of critical comments and hypotheses can be made, however.
First, further data on the growth of SDCs can enhance our understanding of how SDCs arise in particular contexts. Beyond the limited literature review provided in the current article, a much more robust collection and analysis of data on the growth of SDCs is in order. Qualitative and comparative historical data from within and beyond Europe can aid in this endeavor.
Second, the data do not reveal the actual impacts and outcomes of SDCs. SDCs may be important vehicles for impacting how and why frontiers are surveilled, but the data in this article do not reveal the impact of SDCs, only their social structure. For example, it is unclear if the technologies designed within PERSEUS (or within SDCs in general) have been implemented beyond the demonstration, as the limited web data available are not conclusive. It is plausible that the money spent within SDCs has few other deliverables than large-scale demonstration projects, and we must question the level of 'pork' found in SDCs (i.e. using R&D funding to support organizations which are important for supporting loyal political constituencies) (Lakoff and Klinenberg 2010) . In other words, we should remain critical to decisions over the allocation of funding to SDCs and scrutinize their impact.
Third, it is important to observe which organizations may benefit from the growth of SDCs. Although the network data do not reveal which organizations stand to benefit in the field, we may generate some hypotheses based on the position of organizations within the network. Since the data show evidence of industry centrality within the networks, these may be the main organizations which stand to benefit from the growth in surveillance technologies, rather than EU civil society or fundamental rights organizations, which are not present within the current SDC network. As industry, as a central actor, may shape the design, production, and spread of new surveillance technologies through specific networks, industry may also influence the negotiation of policies related to the newly designed technologies, as evidenced by the central role played by the JRC of the Commission, a major conduit through which policy information is expected to flow in multiple directions and across multiple scales. Future work could elucidate the complex ways in which the interests of the surveillance industry are served over the interests of other organizations both within and without the network.
Finally, the central involvement of public security organizations (both national and supranational), public and applied research organizations, and large-scale defense and security firms means that state-led models of border surveillance are coupled with market logics of investment and research design, potentially leading to models of border surveillance which conform not to the demands of citizens or civil society, but to the logics, practices, and knowledges of specific surveillance design communities involved in the research and development of surveillance technologies. In other words, it is plausible that the EU, national governments, research, and private industry work together as strategic partners in researching, designing, and marketing border surveillance at the expense of alternative organizations from civil society. Since many FP7 projects have embedded ethical working groups where surveillance scholars participate, it would be enlightening to see how surveillance scholars may impact the growth and impact of SDCs.
Further work could probe the main organizations which benefit from the growth and impact of SDCs, and how shifts in the composition of SDCs occur over time may impact democratic oversight and accountability over the technologies produced with SDCs, as the design phase of surveillance technologies has emerged as an ethical and political concern for Europe.
Conclusion
The data show that the main organizations involved in SDCs are distributed among a small core of central organizations surrounded by communities of actors participating within various FP7 research projects. Rather than being decentralized or de-linked along a diffuse chain of actors, SDCs contain highly centralized organizations which are simultaneously members of multiple overlapping hierarchies which cohere in communities. Here we see SDCs not as simply decentralized sites where states outsource control to private actors, but as overlapping communities composed of hierarchical relations spanning multiple scales. SDCs exemplify the teichopolitical strategies and projects of the EU and its networked structures of border surveillance.
In response to the weaknesses of the conception of the security-industrial complex, I suggest that critical network analysis, when located within a network theoretic framework sensitive to teichopolitics and statemarket maneuvers, is useful in refining conceptions of the security-industrial complex and in analyzing the community structures and networks of surveillance technology design. In this context, however, the current analysis is limited for the following reasons, and could be supported by further research: (a) data are limited and focused on FP7 projects, (b) the network analysis provides only a static snapshot of a network which is in constant transformation, (c) the focus on border surveillance is narrow, and other domains of surveillance could be well analyzed in comparison, and (d) the organizational and project levels only capture dynamics at particular scales, obscuring social dynamics at alternative scales. Further work can address these limitations by taking into considerations the points of discussion in the section above, as well as (a) looking beyond FP7 projects for the formation of SDCs, (b) focusing on longitudinal change of SDCs, depending on the availability of data, (c) widening the scope to graph and analyze other SDCs as well as other geographical regions beyond Europe, and (d) produce new network data on the actors involved or compliment network analyses with ethnographic and qualitative portraits of relations at the micro-and meso-scales.
Finally, the organizational structure of SDCs in Europe is complex, and the average European citizen may be unaware of such structural complexity: power over the design of border surveillance in the EU is so concentrated among a handful of central organizations participating in a small number of design communities that the average citizen does not notice. For this reason it is important to continue to methodically map the social relations of SDCs in other contexts in order to shed light on the structural complexity of surveillance in Europe. Applied work which addresses the ways in which SDCs can be made more accountable, democratic, and organizationally diverse is welcome. Sea surveillance: "To provide the EU with an operational and technical framework to increase situational awareness and improve the reaction capability of authorities surveying the external borders of the EU, and to address solutions for the pre-operational validation of the "Common Application of Surveillance Tools at EU level." CLOSEYE "comes in response to an urgent sudden major challenge for the control of the migratory pressure from the North African coast and to a limited market providing innovative solutions for the accomplishment of major operational objectives. CLOSEYE articulates this POV through three phases encompassing the necessary activities projects due to the following main features:
•A two-tier intelligent heterogeneous UAV sensor network will be considered in order to provide both large field and focused surveillance capabilities, where the first-tier sensors, carried by medium altitude, long-endurance autonomous UAVs, are used to patrol large border areas to detect suspicious targets and provide global situation awareness. Fed with the information collected by the firsttier sensors, the second-tier sensors will be deployed to provide more focused surveillance capability by tracking the targets and collecting further evidence for more accurate target recognition and threat evaluation. Novel algorithms will be developed to analyse the data collected by the sensors for robust and accurate target identification and event detection;
•Novel sensors and on-board processing generation, integrated on UAV system, will be focus on low weight, low cost, high resolution that can operate under variable conditions such as darkness, snow, and rain. In particular, SUNNY will develop sensors that generate both RGB image, Near Infrared (NIR) image and hyperspectral image and that use radar information to detect, discriminate and track objects of interest inside complex environment, over land and sea. Alloying to couple sensor processing and preliminary detection results (on-board) with local UAV control, leading to innovative active sensing techniques, replacing low level sensor data communication by a higher abstraction level of information communication.
• 
